Meade: “You will immediately withdraw your corps from its present position and move to Cold Harbor”

We are receiving reports that Lee is moving on Cold Harbor in force.

HDQRS. CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Cold Harbor, Va., May 31, 1864.

Major-General HUMPHREYS,

Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: All the indications to-day lead to the brief that the enemy meditated an attack on the First Division of cavalry posted 1 1\2 miles from Cold Harbor, so I gave permission to General Torbert to attack them. He did so, encountering Fitz. Lee’s division of cavalry and one brigade of Hoke’s division of infantry (Clingman’s), driving them from their barricades in Cold Harbor, and capturing about half a regiment and 15 of Clingman’s infantry. Since then the second brigade, of Hoke’s division, has arrived. I do not feel able to hold this place, and have directed General Torbert to resume his position of this morning. Lee’s line of battle is in front of Mechanicsville, and, with the heavy odds against me here, I do not think it prudent to hold on. The enemy is now extending toward Gaines’ Hill, to cover the bridges across the Chickahominy.

The First Division behaved very gallantly. The wounded are all being sent to the rear. We will have 70 or 80.

Very respectfully,

P. H. SHERIDAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

 

We must immediately move to check him.  Gen. Meade wrote to Gen. Wright commanding the 6th Corps,

MAY 31, 1864-9.45 p. m.

Major-General WRIGHT:

You will immediately withdraw your corps from its present position and move to Cold Harbor, about 2 1\2 miles east of Bethesda Church. Our cavalry now have possession of Cold Harbor, having this afternoon driven from it the enemy’s cavalry and infantry. The cavalry are directed to hold on until your arrival, and it is of the utmost importance you should reach the point as soon after daylight as possible. Your route will be by Haw’s Shop and Old Church. You will endeavor, if possible, to notify the cavalry on your right of your withdrawal. Possibly a road from Gilmans’ may be found cutting off Old Church. You will notify General Hancock when the last of your troops are moving.

GEO. G. MEADE,

Major-General.

 

Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, Gordon Rhea, Chpt 6

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 3, p 404, 411

“The enemy came out on our left last evening and attacked.”

I wrote Gen. Halleck,

HAW’S SHOP, VA., May 31, 1864 – 6 a. m.

The enemy came out on our left last evening and attacked. They were easily repulsed and with very considerable slaughter. To relieve General Warren, who was on he left, speedily, General Meade ordered an attack by the balance of our line. General Hancock was the only one who received the order in time to make the attack before dark. He drove the enemy from his entrenched skirmish line and still holds it. I have no report of our losses, but suppose them to be light.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 499-500

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 1, p 10

“There seems to be some prospect of Lee making a stand north of the Chickahominy”

We have sent the troops forward to attempt to determine the position of Lee’s army.  They are receiving stiffer resistance than expected, which may indicate that Lee has not withdrawn south of the Chickahominy River.  I wrote Gen. Halleck,

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff.

TWO MILES SOUTHWEST OF HAW’S SHOP,

May 30, 1864 – 4 p. m.

There seems to be some prospect of Lee making a stand north of the Chickahominy, his right near Shady Grove. I have heard nothing yet of Smith’s troops reaching White House. If I can get up to attack will not wait his arrival. I wish you would send all the pontoon bridging you can to City Point to have it ready n case it is wanted.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 495-6

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 1, p 10

“The army has been successfully crossed over the Pamunkey”

I wrote Gen. Halleck

HANOVERTOWN, VA., May 29, 1864.

The army has been successfully crossed over the Pamunkey and now occupies a front about 3 miles south of the river. Yesterday two divisions of our cavalry had a severe engagement with the enemy south of Harris’ [Haw’s] Store, driving him about a mile upon what appears to be his new line. We will find out all about it to-day. Our loss in the cavalry engagement was 350 killed and wounded, of whom but 44 are ascertained to have been killed. Having driven the enemy, most of their killed and many of their wounded fell to our hands.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 494

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 1, p 9-10

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

“To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify”

I wrote Gen. Halleck,

Major-General HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Quarles’ Mills, Va., May 26, 1864.

GENERAL: The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee’s right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of North Anna, his center on the river at Ox Ford, and his left on Little River, with the crossing of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock, with his corps and one division of the Ninth Corps, crossed at Chesterfield Ford, and covers the right wing of Lee’s army. One division of the Ninth Corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it, where both banks are held by us, so that it could re-enforce either went of our army with equal facility. The Fifth and Sixth Corps, with one division of the Ninth Corps, run from the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford to Little River and parallel with and near to the enemy. To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by his left leaves Little River, New Found River, and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of an army, to be crossed. I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy’s right by crossing at or near Hanovertown. This crosses all these streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. During the night last night the teams and artillery, not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this division, with most of the cavalry, will commence a forced march for Hanovertown to seize and hold the crossing. the balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour and follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. Lee’s army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of entrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy and attack with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee’s army is already insured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded re-enforcements have contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men and to break down that of the enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap in the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rails from elsewhere.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 490-1

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 1, p 8-9

 

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

“Direct Gens. Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery … to the north side of the river to-morrow”

The consensus among the army staff is that Lee’s position is too strong to attack.  We will have to try another turning movement to our left.  I wrote Gen. Meade,

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, Quarles’ Mills, Va., May 25, 1864.

Major General G. G. MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery not in position to the north side of the river to-morrow. Send that belonging to General Wright’s corps as far on the road to Hanovertown as it can go without attracting attention to the fact. Send with it Wright’s best division, or division under his ablest commander. Have this place filled up in the line, so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary to watch and seize, if they can, Littlepage’s Bridge and Taylor’s Ford, and to remain on one or the other side of the river at those points until the infantry and artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from Wright’s corps to make a forced march to Hanovertown, taking with them no teams to impede their march. At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the Fifth and Sixth Corps from the south side of the river and march them for the same place. The two divisions of the Ninth Corps not now with Hancock may be moved down the north bank of the river, where they will be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him to-morrow. It will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanovertown they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

I think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy’s left to-morrow afternoon also.

U. S. G.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, vol 10, p 488-9

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 3, p 183

“The enemy are evidently making a determined stand between the two Annas”

I wrote Gen. Halleck,

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff.

JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864 – 12 noon.

The enemy are evidently making a determined stand between the two Annas. It will probably take us two days to get in position for a general attack or to turn their position, as may prove best. Send Butler’s forces to White House to land on north side and march up to join this army. The James River should be held to City Point, but leave nothing more than is absolutely necessary to hold it, acting purely on the defensive. The enemy will not undertake any offensive operations there, but will concentrate everything here. Breckinridge is unquestionably here. Sixty-six officers and men have been captured who were with Hoke in the capture of Plymouth. If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canals should be destroyed beyond possibility of repair for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 487-8

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 1, p 8

“The situation of the enemy appearing so different from what I expected …”

It now appears I was mistaken about the enemy falling back towards Richmond.  They seem intent on holding their present line.  With our army divided, we are in a precarious position.  I wrote Gen. Burnside,

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, Jericho Ford, Va., May 24, 1864-8.20 p.m.

Major-General BURNSIDE,

Commanding Ninth Corps:

GENERAL: The situation of the enemy appearing so different from what I expected, I do not deem it advisable for you to move your wagon train to the south side of the river to-night, or not any more of it than may now be on the south side. The enemy holding the south bank of the river at Ox Ford, I think it important that you should hold the north side of the same place. You will, therefore, leave at least a battery, supported by a regiment of infantry, well stationed for that purpose. I understand you are moving two divisions to connect with Hancock, and one above Ox Ford to connect with Warren. This will be the best arrangement that can be adopted, and if it is not already carried out you will carry it out at once. Bridges will be laid above and below the point on the river held by the enemy, and as near to it as possible, to-morrow morning, and roads opened between them, so as to bring our right and left as near supporting distance as possible. The only portion of this work you will be charged with will be opening the road near the river between the two bridges. The upper bridge will be laid near Quarles’ Mills. The place for the lower one cannot be determined to-night. It may not be practicable to lay a bridge above the one Hancock now has. You may, therefore, regard the points to be connected by new roads as being that bridge and Quarles’ Mills.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

 

To the North Anna River, Gordon Rhea

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 3, p 168-9

Hancock: “The enemy are making a strong attack down the railroad”

We have been receiving disturbing reports from Gen. Hancock, indicating that the enemy have not fallen back, but are making a stand between the North and South Anna rivers.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, May 24, 1864-5.10 p.m.

Brigadier-General WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac:

I have just taken a prisoner from Field’s division. He was on the skirmish line; says the line of battle was about 250 yards behind. That the enemy are in strong force is probable, as we meet them in works all along our front some distance out. I shall make an advance of a division in a few minutes, and will support it, if necessary.

Your obedient servant,

WINF’D S. HANCOCK,

Major-General, Commanding.

 
HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, May 24, 1864-6.30 p.m.

General S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: The enemy are making a strong attack down the railroad, particularly on Gibbon. Barlow is now going in on his right. It looks to me as if the enemy had a similar line to that on the Po, with the salient resting opposite to Burnside, and their right, so far as we are concerned, thrown back toward Hanover Junction.

WINF’D S. HANCOCK,

Major-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

 

To the North Anna River, Gordon Rhea, Chpt. 10

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 3, p 153

“You will move your entire corps, with trains, to the south side of North Anna this afternoon”

We must get Burnside’s corps across the North Anna to connect our two bridgeheads.  I directed Rawlins to send this order,

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, Mount Carmel Church, Va., May 24, 1864-1 p.m.

Major General A. E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding Ninth Army Corps:

GENERAL: You will move your entire corps, with trains, to the south side of North Anna this afternoon. General Warren has sent a division on the south side to drive the enemy away from his position opposite you, and General Hancock has sent a brigade for the same purpose. The ford must be opened by the time this reaches you. If not there is one about 1 mile farther up, between you and Warren, that is open; at least, is so reported. You can cross at this one and also at the bridge where Hancock crossed, marching your troops thus crossed to a point opposite to where you now are on the south side. You must get over and camp to-night on the south side. To-night these headquarters will be on the south of the river on the Telegraph road.

By command of Lieutenant-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

 

To the North Anna River, Gordon Rhea, Chpt 10

O.R., I, xxxvi, part 3, p 167