Yesterday I wrote Julia,

June 29th 1863

Dear Julia,
During the present week I think the fate of Vicksburg will be decided. Johnston is still hovering beyond the Black river and will attack before you receive this or never. After accumulating so large an army as he has, at at such risk of loosing other points in the Confederacy by doing it, he cannot back out without giving battle or losing prestige. I expect a fight by Wednesday or Thursday. There may be much loss of life but I feel but little doubt as to the result.—Saturday or Sunday next I set for the fall of Vicksburg. You can come down then and bring the children with you. We will have to make some arrangement for them to go to school as soon as schools open after vacation. You will have to stay with them as a general thing but by selecting a good place for you and them to board you can visit me a part of the time, when I am still. I do not expect to be still much however whilst the war lasts.
Fred, has returned from his uncles. He does not look very well but is not willing to go back until Vicksburg falls. I think I will send him a trip as far North as St. Paul after the fall of Vicksburg.  Remember me to all at home. You do not say whether you have leased the farm or not. I do not want White to hold it.
Kiss the children for me.
Ulys.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 444-5

Library of Congress, Ulysses S Grant

June 29 1863.  I have received a copy of Gen. Sherman’s orders positioning his troops to detect an attack from Gen. Johnston.  I wrote him,

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Near Vicksburg, June 29, 1863.

Major General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Comdg. Fifteenth Army Corps:

GENERAL: Your general order, blank number, is received. The dispositions you made are excellent. It will be impossible for Johnston to cross the Big Black River, north of the railroad, without being discovered and your troops ready for him. My only apprehensions are that Johnston, finding us so ready, may cover a movement south, and dash in at Baldwin’s and south of that before troops can be got out to meet him. A move of this kind certainly could not be made for anything more than a diversion to relieve the Vicksburg garrison. It does not look to me as if Johnston would ever think of bringing his wagon train across Big Black River south of us. I had but little confidence in the blockading of the roads south of the Jackson road; something has been [done], however, and will help a little if Johnston should attempt to come in that way. Ord’s cavalry watch all the ferries south of Baldwin’s, and though they sometimes see rebel cavalry east of the river, yet they discover no signs of an attempt to cross.

I sent out a scout, who traveled for some time east from Big Black River bridge and south of the railroad. He says no troops have gone south of the railroad.  The same statement is made by a deserter from one of the Texas brigades stationed at Bolton Station; but this information is several days old. In the mean time Johnston may have changed his plans and the position of his troops half a dozen times. You need not fear, general, my tender heart getting the better of me, so as to send the secession ladies to your front; on the contrary, I rather think it advisable to send out every living being from your lines, and arrest all persons found within who are not connected with the army.

Very truly, yours,

U. S. GRANT.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 442

O.R., I, xxiv, part 3, p 449

June 28 1863.  There is the chance that rebel Gen. Kirby Smith may attack our troops from the Louisiana side of the Mississippi River in an attempt to relieve the siege.  I wrote to warn Gen. Dennis,

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE TENN., near Vicksburg, June 27, 1863.

Brigadier General E. S. DENNIS, Comdg. District of Northeastern Louisiana:

GENERAL: There is now a probability that [E. K.] Smith will come into the point opposite Vicksburg, for the purpose of aiding the rebel garrison in their escape or to furnish them supplies. Should you discover any attempt of the kind, concentrate your whole force, black and white, from Lake Providence, down at Young’s Point, or the most suitable place for resisting them. With Johnston in my rear, I cannot detach troops for that purpose. Should such a move become necessary, notify the negro commissioners of the fact, so that they can warn the planters in time to drive in their stock and hands within our lines for safety.

You had better notify the commissioners at once that such a course may become necessary.

Respectfully,
U. S. GRANT

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 438-9

O.R., I, xxiv, part 3, p 444

It seems as though Gen. Johnston is going to wait for reinforcements before attempting to relieve the siege of Vicksburg.  This should give us enough time to take the city.  I wrote Gen. Halleck,

NEAR Vicksburg, MISS., June 27, 1863.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

Joe Johnston has postponed his attack until he can receive 10,000 re-enforcements, now on their way from Bragg’s army. They are expected early next week. I feel strong enough against this increase, and do not despair of having Vicksburg before they arrive. This latter, however, I may be disappointed in. I may have to abandon protection to the leased plantations from here to Lake Providence, to resist a threat from Kirby Smith’s troops. The location of these leased plantations was most unfortunate, and against my judgment. I wanted them put north of the White River.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

O.R., I, xxiv, part 1, p 43-4

I wrote Gen. Halleck,

NEAR Vicksburg, MISS., June 26, 1863.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

Yesterday a mine was sprung under the enemy’s most commanding fort, producing a crater sufficient to hold two regiments of infantry. Our men took immediate possession, and still hold it. The fight for it has been incessant, and thus far we have not been able to establish batteries in the breach. Expect to succeed. Joe Johnston has removed east of the Big Black. His movements are mysterious, and may be intended to cover a movement from his rear into East or WEST Tennessee, or upon Banks. I have General Sherman out near his front on the Big Black with a large force watching him. I will use every effort to learn any move Johnston may make, and send troops from here to counteract any change he may make, if I can.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 431-2

O.R., I, xxiv, part 1, p 43

Gen. McPherson has been unable to hold the crater and has pulled back his troops.  I received the following telegram from his adjutant.

JUNE [25], 1863.

Colonel RAWLINS:

Find it impossible to hold [this] point without great sacrifice of life. Have withdrawn men, and have opened with artillery. Think we shall yet hold it.

[WM. T.] CLARK,

[Assistant Adjutant-General.]

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 421

O.R., I, xxiv, part 3, p 441

Gen. McPherson has blown a hole in the enemy’s defenses and is attempting to exploit the opening.  I sent word to Gen. Ord,

NEAR Vicksburg, June 25, 1863.

General ORD:

McPherson secured the crater made by the explosion. The cavity made was sufficiently large to shelter two regiments. The enemy made an effort to drive our troops away. Our loss about 30 killed and wounded, some ten of them officers, and 3 field officers. Guns will be in the crater by morning, with rifle-pits to the left to defend it. If we can hold the position until morning it will evidently give us possession of a long line of rifle-pits to the right, and a fair way of advancing to enfilade to the left.

U. S. GRANT.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 416

O.R., I, xxiv, part 3, p 441

Gen. McPherson’s men have succeeded in digging a mine underneath the defenses of Vicksburg.  He will pack the mine full of black powder and explode it, hopefully blowing enough of a hole for us to attack.  I wrote the other commanders to be prepared to exploit any advantage gained.

NEAR Vicksburg, June 25, 1863-12 m.

Major General F. J. HERRON:

One of our mines in General McPherson’s front will be exploded at 3 p. m. to-day. Have your rifle-pits well filled with men, and the remainder of your line, and when you hear the explosion open with all your artillery that is in position for FIFTEEN or twenty [minutes], and should you discover any signs of the enemy moving troops toward (the end) McPherson’s, you will make such demonstrations as to lead him to believe you intend to attack him.

U. S. GRANT.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 415

O.R., I, xxiv, part 3, p 441

I received the following dispatch from Gen. Ord.

ORD’S HEADQUARTERS, June 23, 1863.

Pretty lively firing on my left, as if a sally. I have sent to Lauman and A. Hovey, if an attack occurs on either side of them, to re-enforce the point attacked.

E. O. C. ORD,

Major-General.

 

I sent word to the other commanders to be prepared for an attack.

 Near Vicksburg
June 23d 1863
Gen. McPherson.
Genl Ord reports the firing on his left, as if a Sally were being made. Have your forces in readiness for any action.
U. S. Grant

Maj. Gen

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 409-10

O.R., I, xxiv, part 2, p 208

National Archives, RG 393, Dept. of the Tenn, Letters Sent

I wrote Gen. Sherman,

NEAR Vicksburg, MISS., June 22, 1863.

Major General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Comdg. Fifteenth Army Corps:

Information just received indicates that the enemy are crossing Big Black River, and intend marching against us by way of Bear Creek. They probably will start out to-morrow. I have ordered Parke to move out with four brigades to support his cavalry and hold the enemy as near Big Black River as possible until their position is clearly defined, when we can draw all our forces from Snyder’s Bluff and the forces previously indicated here to their support. Tuttle’s DIVISION should be marched out within supporting distance of Parke at once. You will go and command the entire force. Your wagon train can move from wherever you may be to Lake’s Landing or Snyder’s Bluff, whichever may be the most convenient for supplies and ordnance stores. When on the ground you can draw troops from Snyder’s Bluff and the three brigades designated from McPherson’s corps directly, without communicating through headquarters. Should any [further] forces become necessary, I can take them from our left by leaving that in the same condition it was before the arrival of Lauman and Herron.

U. S. GRANT.

 

The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 8, p 408

O.R., I, xxiv, part 3, p 428