“Please order General C. C. Washburn to proceed at once to Memphis and relieve Genl Hurlbut”

We must have a more vigorous response to Forrest’s incursion into Tennessee and Kentucky.  I have ordered Gen. Hurlbut to be relieved.  I wrote Gen. Halleck,

Culpeper Va.
7 P m April 16th 1864
Maj Genl H W Halleck Chief of Staff
Please order General C. C. Washburn to proceed at once to Memphis and relieve Genl Hurlbut in command of district of West Tennessee General Hurlbut to report from Cairo by letter to the Adjutant General at what point orders will reach him I do not want W. assigned to command of sixteenth (16) Army Corps but will leave Genl Dodge to command that portion in the field Gen Crittenden may be ordered to report to General Burnside
U. S. Grant
Lt Gen Comdg


I also wrote Gen. Rosecrans in Missouri to urge him to send reinforcements to Cairo.

CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., April 16, 1864-10.30 a. m.

Major General W. S. ROSECRANS,

Saint Louis, Mo.:

Send the Twelfth Missouri, Ninth Iowa, and Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry to Cairo without delay. You may replace as many of them as you may require about Saint Louis from other parts of your command.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 290-1, 294

National Archives, RG 94, Letters Received

O.R., I, xxxiv, part 3, p 184

“If our men have been murdered after capture, retaliation must be resorted to promptly.”

I received the following disturbing news of a rebel atrocity that occurred a few days ago at Fort Pillow in Tennessee.  Reportedly, colored troops were killed after surrendering to forces under the command of Gen. Forrest.  Gen. Sherman writes,

Nashville, Tenn., April 15, 1864.

Lieutenant-General GRANT,

Culpeper, Va.:

General Brayman reports from Cairo the arrival of 50 wounded white soldiers from Fort Pillow, and that the place was attacked on the 12th, 50 white soldiers killed and 100 taken prisoners, and 300 blacks murdered after surrender. I don’t know what these men were doing at Fort Pillow. I ordered it to be abandoned before I went to Meridian, and it was so abandoned. General Hurlbut must have sent this garrison up recently from Memphis. So many are on furlough that Grierson and Hurlbut seem to fear going out of Memphis to attack Forrest. I have no apprehension for the safety of Paducah, Columbus, or Memphis, but without drawing from Dodge, I have no force to send over there, and don’t want to interrupt my plans of preparation for the great object of the spring campaign. I expect McPherson’s two divisions from Vicksburg to rendezvous at Cairo from furlought about the 20th, and I look for A. J. Smith up daily from Red River. Whenever either of these commands arrive I can pen Forrest up, but will take some time to run him down. Do you want me to delay for such a purpose, but shall I go on to concentrate on Chattanooga?

I don’t know what to do with Hurlbut. I know that Forrest could men him up in Memphis with 2,500 men, although Hurlbut has all of Grierson’s cavalry and 2,500 white infantry, 4,000 blacks, and the citizen militia, 3,000. If you think I have time I will send a division from Dodge to Purdy, and order A. J. Smith as he comes up to strike island to Bolivar, Jackson, &c., and some across by land to the Tennessee. This may consume an extra two weeks.

Corse was at Vicksburg ready to start up the Red River the 8th.




I replied,


April 15, 1864-8 p.m.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Forrest must be driven out, with a proper commander in West Tennessee there is force enough now. Your preparations for the coming campaign must go on, but if it is necessary to detach a portion of the troops intended for it, detach them and make your campaign with that much fewer men.

Relieve Major General S. A. Hurlbut. I can send General Washburn, a sober and energetic officer, to take his place. I can also send you General L. C. Hunt to command District of Columbus. Shall I send Washburn? Does General Hurlbut think if he moves a part of his force the only enemy within 200 miles of him that the post will run off with the balance of his force?

If our men have been murdered after capture, retaliation must be resorted to promptly.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 284-5

O.R., I, xxxii, part 3, p 366-7

“The late rain has so far set back offensive operations that we can change plan … any time in the next ten days”

I am in Annapolis MD, visiting Gen. Burnside and his 9th Corps.  I received a telegram from Gen. Sigel complaining of bad road conditions.  I wrote him,

WASHINGTON CITY, April 12, 1864-1. 30 p. m.

Major-General SIGEL,

Cumberland, Md.:

Your letter received. Will not a week or ten days’ good weather make the programme laid out in my previous instructions practicable? The route you now suggest, that is, by sending the whole force to Gauley Bridge to start, was my idea exactly, simply consulting the map, without any personal knowledge of the country to be traversed. Consultation, however, with officers who had been in the country induced me to give the instructions I did. The late rain has so far set back offensive operations that we can change plan, if found necessary, any time in the next ten days.



He replied,

CUMBERLAND, MD., April 12, 1864-7 p. m.

Lieutenant-General GRANT,

Washington, D. C.:

Your dispatch of to-day is received. I will continue in making all dispositions necessary to carry out your programme. According to it there would be only three regiments of infantry left, besides the rest of Averell’s cavalry, to defend or move up the Shenandoah Valley. Ten would go with General Ord, six, with General Crook, besides the Thirty-sixth Ohio, and four would be posted on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Monocacy to Parkersburg, among them two Maryland and one Virginia regiments, raised for local defense, and necessary to guard our stores and depots and to load and unload trains.




I replied,

ANNAPOLIS, April 13, 1864-10 a. m.

Major-General SIGEL, Cumberland, Md.:

Your dispatch of yesterday is received, and is satisfactory. A movement up the Shenandoah Valley, if necessary to make it, will not require much more than an escort for the wagon train. I have directed a regiment of heavy artillery to be sent to you from Baltimore, which I do not see enters into your calculation of forces. In addition to this I may in case of an urgent necessity be able to send you, say, four more regiments of infantry from Washington, when the time for moving arrives.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 282, 285

O.R., I, xxxiii, p 845, 858

Sherman: “If the enemy interrupt my communications, I…will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever…I can find”

I received a reply from Gen. Sherman to my letter outlining the general plan of campaign this spring.



Nashville, Tenn., April 10, 1864.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

Commander-in-Chief,Washington, D. C.:


Your two letters of April 4 are now before me, and afford me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to act in a common plan, converging on a common center, looks like enlightened war.

Like yourself you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty co-operation. I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan, in which I am to knock Joe Johnston, and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and Colonel Babcock, of your staff, somewhat of the method in which I propose to act. I have seen all my army corps and division commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz, Schofield, Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.

First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch, and am completing the organization according to the orders from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory. I did not wish to displace Palmer, but asked George Thomas to tell me in all frankness exactly what he wanted. All he asked is granted, and all he said was that Palmer, but asked George Thomas to tell me in all frankness exactly what he wanted. All he asked is granted, and all he said was that Palmer felt unequal to so large a command, and would be willing to take a division, provided Buell or some tried and experienced soldier were given the corps. But on the whole Thomas is now well content with his command; so are Schofield and McPherson.

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to bring up A. J. Smith’s command, and to collect provisions and cattle to the line of the Tennessee. Each of the three armies will guard by detachments of its own their rear communications. At the signal to be given by you, Schofield will leave a select garrison at Knoxville and Loudon, and with 12,000 men drop down to Hiwassee and march on Johnston’s right by the old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky organizing the cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield on his left front; it may be, pushing a select body of about 2,000 cavalry by Ducktown on Ellijay and toward Athens.

Thomas will aim to have 45,000 men of all arms and move straight on Johnston wherever he may be, fighting him cautiously, persistently, and to the best of advantage. He will have two divisions of cavalry to take advantage of any offering.

McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee if A. J. Smith gets in, in which case he will have full 30,000 of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome and feel for Thomas. If Johnston fall behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for Rome, and if Johnston then fall behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe he will, then McPherson will cross and join with Thomas. McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas’ divisions, viz, Garrard’s, 6,000 strong, which I now have at Columbia, mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this division to operate on McPherson’s right rear or front, according as the enemy appears; but the moment I detect Johnston falling behind the Chattahochee, I propose to cast off the effective part of this cavalry division, after crossing Coosa, straight for Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road between Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work good, he can return to the main army; but should a superior force interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola, and join Banks, or after rest act against any force that he can find on the east of Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.

Should Johnston fall behind Chattahoochee I would feint to the right, but pass to the left, and act on Atlanta, or on its eastern communications, according to developed facts.

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look, but I would ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot, in any event, send any part of his command against your or Banks.

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama River he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem-provisions. But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt my communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own sources, but will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and whenever I can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with my feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and parched corn fed General Jackson’s army once on that very ground.

As ever, your friend and servant,




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 252-4

O.R., I, xxxii, part 3, p 312-4

“Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also.”

I wrote Gen. Meade to give him the outline of the upcoming campaign.


April 9, 1864.

Major General G. G. MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

For information, and as instructions to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially, for your own perusal alone:

So far as practicable, all the armies are to move together and toward one common center. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and to the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can-not less than 25,000 men-to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to any other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon.

Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Joe Johnston’s army being his objective point and the heart of Georgia hisi ultimate aim. If successful, he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to re-enforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns of his command will move south at the same time with the general move, one from Beverly, from 10,000 to 12,000 strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, W. Va., principally cavalry, under Brigadier-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord’s command will try to force a passage southward; if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and Southwest.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Major General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours.

Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid; but if we take this route all we do must be done while the rations we start with hold out; we separate from Butler, so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route, Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James River. These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.

Burnside, with a force of probably 25,000 men, will re-enforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th instant, I will give him the defense of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.

There will be naval co-operations on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided, so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond Butler’s force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.

What I would direct, then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of 500 men is the greatest number that should be allowed for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient, and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee’s right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House, on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.

If Lee’s left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of 500 rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 273-5

O.R., I, xxxiii, 827-9

Sherman: “Forrest will escape us.”

Concerned with the ongoing situation with Forrest’s raid into Kentucky, I wrote Gen. Sherman,

April 8, 1864-9.30 p. m.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN:

As I notified you before leaving Nashville, I believe the rebels will attempt a raid into Kentucky by the way of Pound gap or that vicinity as soon as they can travel. From information just received at Washington, Longstreet’s force may be added to Breckinridge’s to make this so formidable as to upset offensive operations on our part. By vigilance in Southeast Kentucky, which I know you are wide awake to see the necessity of, such a raid can be made disastrous to the rebels and still leave us free to act offensively from Chattanooga. If Forrest succeeds in getting his force out of Kentucky and West Tennessee, do you not think a bolder commander than General Hurlbut will be required for holding the Mississippi firmly?




I received his reply today.

NASHVILLE, TENN., April 9, 1864.

Lieutenant-General GRANT,


Your dispatch of yesterday is received. I have Stoneman now in East Kentucky with all the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio. General Schofield’s troops are at Bull’s Gap, and I have no indications of an invasion of Kentucky from Pound Gap. That road is very long and very bad. Forrest will escape us. Veatch went to Waverly and came away without orders, because he could hear nothing of Forrest.

We will want a bolder man than Hurlbut at Memphis. Why not send Buell?

Should any force come into East Kentucky could it not be checkmated by a comparatively small force sent to the mouth of Big Sandy to march by Louisa and Prestonburg? In the mean time I am collecting everything with General Schofield, Generals Thomas and McPherson to act offensive south of the Tennessee.

I will continue to draw here all detachments and furloughed men. I am also endeavoring to accumulate surplus stores to the front, which would enable me to move troops rapidly by railroad.

McPherson’s two divisions will soon begin to arrive at Cairo from their furloughs.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 270-2

O.R., I, xxxii, part 3, p 288, 305

“I have ordered all the troops that can be spared from the States west of the Ohio to be sent to you”

Gen. Sherman wrote me, asking for additional troops for Gen. Steele to use in the upcoming campaign.

NASHVILLE, TENN., April 7, 1864 – 10 a. m.

Lieutenant-General GRANT,

Culpeper Court-House:

I will instruct Steele. Shreveport is the grand doorway to Texas, and the key of the entire Southwest. Alexandria is next. To hold both Steele will want all the available troops now in Kansas and Missouri. I had sent for my 10,000 under A. J. Smith to return to Vicksburg and thence up Yazoo to Grenada. We must do this to underact the effect of our cavalry weakness as against Forrest, and I suppose you will want Banks to turn his whole attention against Mobile. In time we should have a brigade and depot of supplies at Pensacola, a point I propose to reach by a raid aimed at West Point and Columbus, Ga., at some future day. I think you should give Steele all the troops in Kansas and Missouri, leaving Rosecrans and Curtis to manage the militia and civil matters.




I replied,

CULPEPER, VA., April 7, 1864 – 7.30 p. m.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

Nashville, Tenn.,

I have ordered all the troops that can be spared from the States west of the Ohio to be sent to you. You can send them to Steele or where you think best. Rosecrans report he can send no troops. I have an inspector there, however, to see. If possible, I will send Steele some from there. I will make provision at Pensacola for supplying a cavalry force.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 266-7

O.R., I, xxxiv, part 3, p 75

“be in readiness to move at a day’s notice with whatever force you may have at any time after that”

I received the following letter from Gen. Burnside,

NEW YORK, April 4, 1864.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

General-in-Chief, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I beg to inclose to you a copy of letter sent in January last to the Secretary of War. Not knowing if you had seen the latter, and in view of the fact that the Ninth Army Corps, including the old Third Division, will probably be in a few days concentrated at Annapolis and below, with a strength of 40,000 or more men, I deem it not improper to send it for your consideration.

Some of the regiments of the old Third Division are now in the Department of the South, and I would respectfully suggest that some of the old regiments that were with me in North Carolina, and now on furlough from the Department of the South, should be ordered to take their place in the Third Division.

The Twenty-fourth Massachusetts and the Eleventh Connecticut are the two regiments which I would like to have report, instead of the One hundred and seventeenth and One hundred and third and Third New York, now on Folly Island.

The Third Division can be concentrated at Norfolk, or such other point as you may think desirable, and would by this arrangement be composed of the following regiments: The Eighth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-first Connecticut, the Tenth and Thirteenth New Hampshire, the Fourth Rhode Island, now in General Butler’s command, and the Eighty-ninth New York, now on furlough.

If orders could be issued for concentrating this division it would to some extent increase enlistments in the different regiments. I am interesting myself in the recruiting, as if the order had already been issued. I made the application for the increased artillery to General Halleck, and suppose it has been laid before you.

It would seem advisable that the batteries should be ordered to report to the headquarters of the Ninth Corps at Annapolis. It might be advisable to concentrate the Third Division in North Carolina, if it is decided that the future operations of the corps are to be in that section.

I send this by Lieutenant Van Vliet, of my staff.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,



The letter Burnside forwarded gives a plan of action for his men in the Spring, but instead he will have to operate in conjunction with the movements of the rest of the Army.


April 5, 1864.

Major General A. E. BURNSIDE,

Commanding Ninth Army Corps:

Your letter of yesterday, inclosing copy of your letter of the 26th of January to the Secretary of War, was received this morning just as I was leaving Washington, and so short a time before leaving that I did not get to read it until my arrival here.

The plan of operations for this spring’s campaign I fixed upon almost immediately on assuming command of the army, and I yet see no reason to change. It does not embrace the movements proposed in your letter to the Secretary of War. If it did, your request for the return of troops formerly belonging to the Ninth Army Corps would be immediately complied with. I may yet be able to return them to the Ninth Corps, but in can only be after they meet in the field.

The artillery for your command will be taken from the defenses of Washington, where they are now well quartered and provided for. To move them to Annapolis, from which place they would have again to be moved so soon, could not compensate by any benefits to arise from it for the inconvenience of such a transfer, to say nothing of the expense it would put the Government to.

I cannot make clear to you the reasons why your requests for transfer of troops cannot be immediately granted without giving you the plan of operations which I propose, and for which most of the preparatory instructions have already gone out. When we meet I will take great pleasure communicating to you fully (as it will be me duty to do in view of the part you are expected to take) what is to be done. I wish you to get forward to Annapolis by the 20th instant all the force you can, and be in readiness to move at a day’s notice with whatever force you may have at any time after that.

I have appointed Colonel Babcock an aide on my staff, but have not been able to communicate the fact to him. If you know where he is please order him to report to me.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 261-2

O.R., I, xxxiii, p 803, 807-8

“You will … operate on the south side of the James River, Richmond being your objective point”

I have spent the past two days at Fort Monroe, near Norfolk Virginia, consulting with General Butler about the upcoming campaign.  I propose that he will take a force, christened the Army of the James, to move up the James River to threaten Richmond while the Army of the Potomac moves against Lee’s army preventing him from sending reinforcements.  If successful, this movement would force Lee to fall back to Richmond to prevent his supply lines from being cut.  I formalized these discussions in the following letter.


FORT MONROE, VA., April 2, 1864.


Commanding Dept. of Va. and N. C., Fort Monroe, Va.:

In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have co-operative action of all the armies in the field, as far as the object can be accomplished. It will not be possible to united our armies into two or three large ones, to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy; but, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy’s country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, and at least occupy the attention of part of the enemy’s force, if no greater object is gained. Lee’s army and Richmond being the greater objects toward which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force against them.

The necessity for covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac and of covering your department with your army makes it impossible to united these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable. The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee’s army being the objective point.

You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty–I should say not less than 20,000 effective men–to operate on the south side of the James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about 10,000 men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gilmore, who will command them in person. Major General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fort Monroe, with all his troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. When you are notified to move take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

The fact that has already been stated, that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the Army of the Potomac, must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford about the time of the general advance it would be of immense advantage.

You will please forward for my information at the earliest practicable day all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.




The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 245-7

O.R., I, xxxiii, p 794-5

“your movements shall be co-operative with movements of Armies elsewhere and you cannot now start too soon”

I wrote Gen. Banks, giving him specific guidance to concentrate his forces as much as possible and to move against Mobile with haste.  This is necessary to coordinate his movements with the rest of the army.

Washington March 31st 1864
Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks Comd.g Dept. of the Gulf,
In addition to the directions sent you by Lieut. Towner, for immediate concentration at New Orleans of all the forces you can spare from the defence of your Dept. preparatory to a move against Mobile, I would now add the following:
1st If successful in your expedition against Shreveport that you turn over the defence of the Red River to Gen. Steele and the Navy.
2d That you abandon Texas entirely with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions, end At least one half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.
3d By properly fortifying on the Miss. River the force to guard it, from Port Hudson to New Orleans, can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a much less number. Six thousand men would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed West of the river.—According to your last returns this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missou[ri.] If however you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regar[ded] as necessary to keep possession of I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present com- man[d] for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere loose no time in making a demonstration to be followed by an attack, upon Mobile.
Two or more Iron Clads have been will be ordered to report to Admiral Farrigut. This gives him a strong Naval fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the Admiral for his co-operation and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base, but from your long service in the Gulf Dept. you will know best about this matter.
It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements of Armies elsewhere and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing and start at the earliest possible moment.
I am General, very respectfully
your obt. svt.
U. S. Grant
Lt. Gen. Comd.g


The Papers of Ulysses S Grant, Vol 10, p 242-3

O.R. I, xxxiv, part 1, p 11